Many have waxed eloquently on the vinyl chloride (VCM) and polyvinyl chloride (PVC) sagas. Depending on their disciplines,motivation and timing, some have given the problem the kind of treatment designed to conjure up the image of the industrial holocaust of this century; others have' used the handling of it as a model for diagnosis and corrective achievement in the "era of environmentalism." In short, you can find support for theorizing that the vinyl chloride regulatory story is the Last Supper, or "Chock Full of Nuts."
As usual, the truth lies somewhere in between, and the telling of it might well test the powers of a Tacitus or Toynbee. I have no such powers. My qualifications to retell the story are the same as those given by Talleyrand who replied when asked what he contributed to the French Revolution: "I lived through it." To this famous Frenchman's succinct response I must add "so far."
It is never accurate tobreak history into parts since events overlap, chronologically and dyramically. Nevertheless, the practice is time 'honored; it is also the approach least likely to add confusion to this discussion. Hence, please bear with me while Idivide my tale into three chapters of regulatory history--the OcOupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) PVC and VCM stories (Note a). All three areas have a beginNote a: Since we have no shortageof regulatory coverage at this time in our history, I note in passing that other agencies have also played some role in thevinylchlorideexercise. For example, in early 1974, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, as well as FDA and EPA, 'banned the already-outmoded use of vinyl chloride as an aerosol propellant. As with'CPSC, I will only footnote the fact that the Departments of Transportation (DOT) and Housing and Urban Development, as well as many state legislative:and other bodies, have at one time or another played roles on the VCM regulatory scene. The actions tere necessary on occasion (e.g., DOT warning requirements). On others, this is questionable. For the purposes of this paper, little or no further mention will be made of these related activities since I think it fair to say that all amounted to "fallout" from the more essential situations covered here.
ning, more or less well-defined. None of them has an end as yet, but then this is America in the last half of the Twentieth Century. It is a time when agencies issue documents with self-contradicting designations like interim final regulations, or temporary permanent standard. Keeping doors open [n this peculiar' way means few regulatory issues ever appear to be laid to rest.
The first regulatory crisis directly impacting the PVC marketplace came as a resultof an FDA proposal after the surprising finding by Schenley Distillers that VCM was leaching' into alcoholic beverages from polyvinyl chloride liquor bottles.. This 1973 revelation, however, concerneda limited market. It gained nowhere near the media and consumerist attention that came in 1974 when OSHA focused its attention on vinyl chloride after an alert industry physician called attention to his uncovering of an unsuspected occupational health problem.
Somewhat arbitrarily,:then, let's reexamine theOSHA experience following the principle that what the' media finds most worthy-of its attention gets the public's attention and;thusmust'always be dealt with first. Next, I will review the current status of things at FDA, where the impact of regulatory reaction and inaction is stillbeing felt strongly.. Finally, I will do my best to tell you about the prologue for the present state of affairs at the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
As with many raw materials used in' the production of safe and useful f inished products,VCM, the essential building block for PVC, had long been known to cause side effects experienced;. by workers exposed to high concentrations. At extremely high levels, it exhibits a narcotic effect. Knowing what we do today, it is. ironic that the medical profession used VCM as an anesthetic, halting this practice when the.gas was found to cause heart arrhythmia (Ref. 1). At the high levels, vinyl chloride also presents a flammability and explosion risk, readily handled through careful monitoring and use of control technology.
Through the 1960s1 although exposure to moderate concentrations of vinyl chloride was thought to be innocuous, it was discovered'that exposure occasionally led to accroosteolysis, a revetsible disease characterized' by a softening or flattening of the bones in the fingertips (Ref. 2). The disease occurred among heavily-exposed PVC reactor cleaners and could be eliminated by appropriate industrial hygiene measures.
Although a relationship between vinyl chloride and cancer was first documented in studies by Viola in 1970, his findings went virtually unnoticed. Neither government, industry nor labor saw a need to take action becaise the Viola tests with laboratory rats had been conducted at' unrealistically high atmospheric dose levels. They actually bordered on the lower explo-
Heads did start turning, however, when in January, 1974, Dr. Maury Johnson of the B.F. Goodrich Company identified three cases of angiosarcoma, a rare type ,of liver cancer, among PVC employees who. had worked as reactor. cleaners (Ref. .4) . Suspecting VCM as the responsible agent in these three deaths, the company made a public 'announcement to this. effect which attracted wide attention in the press and immediately brought OSHA into the picture. An extensive search by industry through old medical records ultimately confirmed thirteen angiosarcoma deaths of workers exposed to VCM in four U.S.' 'plants (Ref. 5).
These findings prompted those like Dr. Irving Selikoff of Mt. Sinai Hospital in New'York; and later Health, Education and Welfare '(HEW) Secretary Joseph Califano, as well as many OSHA and organized labor leaders to predict anepi,demic of environmentally-caused cancer as a result of worker exposure to vinyl chloride. Their ominous predictions that 'PVC was a virtual time bomb, certain to leave a trail of fatalities in its wake, have since proven as hyperbolic as.' industry immediately protested when the rhetoric was.flowing withgreat impact. Now, some six years after the first of these predictions, and almost three years after Secretary ' Califano's apocalyptic 1978 pronunciations (Ref. 6) , there is no evidence of any excessive number of'cases of angiosarcoma among workers in the vinyl chloride industry. Part of the explanation may lie in changes in industry practices and standards but we feel strongly that the predictions were ungrounded, if not irresponsible, when they were made.
At the time of Goodrich's announcement, the stan-dard for occupational exposure to vinyl chloride was already down to 500 parts per million (ppm) whereas in earlier years levels may have been as high as 4,000 ppm. The 500 ppm exposure ceiling had been adopted on the basisof recommendations from the American conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH). In 1962, it had chosen that level as an appropriate standard after careful review of all then-existing data (Ref. 7).
OSHA's Emergency Temporary Standard, promulgated in response to information presented during the fact-finding hearings held in February of 1974, lowered the maximum VCM exposure limits to 50 ppm (Ref. 8). This tenfold reduction was based primarily on studies conducted by Dr. Caesare Maltoni Of Bologna, Italy, showing that rats exposed to vinyl chloride developed liver cancer at levels above 50 ppm. Shortly thereafter, however, additional animal data from Industrial Biotest Laboratories mdicated that angiosarcomas could in fact be induced in laboratory animals at 50 ppm. As a result, OSHA proposed a permanent "non-detectable" standard for occupational exposure to vinyl chloride prescribing use of an analytical method capable of measuring concentrations at least as low as 1 ppm. The standard further provided that, until such time as engineering controls capable of meeting the standard became available, air line respirator equipment would have to be worn when vinyl chloride concentrations exceeded the "non-detectable" level (Ref. 9).
By approaching the vinyl chloride problem in this manner, OSHA was charged with threatening to close down the entire VCM and PVC industry. Since the "zero" exposure limitations were technologically beyond known compliance capabilities, this limitation could only have been achieved by the full-time use of air line respirators which, were it possible, would involve a different but perhaps equivalent risk of injury to workers. As was stated in one of the briefs filed in the case:
That the use of respiratory equipment can lead directly to severe injury is almost self-evident. This is particularly true where such equipment must be employed in complex industrial manu-• facturing establishments. As a representative of Tenneco pointed out during the course of the OSHA Hearing, workers burdened with bulky breathing equipment or trailing long hoses can find themselves in serious jeopardy in a vinyl chloride facility which, typically, is a "multi-story operation Lwit!i7 many catwalks_or narrow passageways, stairwells, Lan7 moving machinery." Tenneco's representative had reason for being particularly impressed with the hazards involved for he was aware that his company had had at least one employee fatality which occurred when a worker wearing breathing apparatus connected to a lengthy air hose fell from a ladder due to the cumbersome nature of the respiratory equipment. (Ref. 10).
The atmosphere during the required proceedings to bring about adoption of the permanent VCM standard was highly charged. It was made moreso by the media coverage which tended to heighten extravagantly hostile exchanges between labor and industry leaders. Labor and self-appointed environmentalist representatives were convinced that industry had an "in" with the Agency. Industry was sure that the case was prejudged and was incensed when the TV cameras and lay press reporters stayed around at the hearings only while labor leaders spoke their pieces. Accusations of collusion and cover-ups flew like feathers before a fan.
Any suspicions about possible collusion between industry and OSHA were no doubt dispelled on October 1, 1974, when the permanent regulation setting a standard for maximum permissible exposure of 1 ppm (time weighted average, TWA) was signed by then Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety andHealth, John Stender (Ref. 11). Just the night before, the Washington rumor mill had the magic level pegged at a likely 10 ppm, the lowest industry said it could live with.
The regulations finally promulgated by OSHA were, nevertheless, substantially different from those originally proposed. Firstly, OSHA changed from a "non-detectable" to a 1 ppm exposure level for vinyl chloride. This brought the standard into the realm of technological feasibility, albeit the technology would have to be forced; some plants would ultimately be closed; and industry would have to surprise itself on how low it could go. Secondly, a major immediate compliance difficulty was eliminated when OSHA agreed to allow the use of cartridge gas masks rather than the cumbersome air line respirators initially proposed. But for these seemingly minOr yet critically significant changes, the industry might have had to shut down as its spokesmen had predicted. As it turned out, the VCM and PVC producers turned a potential nightmare into what Dr. Irving J. Selikoff, then a thorn in industry's side, now refers to as one of industry's greatest success stories.
Although our unsuccessful challenge of the final standard in the courts was anything but amusing at the time, in retrospect it had its ironic aspects so I thought I would tell you part of the story.
In the period leading up to the formal announcement of the VCM standard by OSHA, industry had no prior knowledge as to what permissible exposure level would be selected. In fact, as I mentioned earlier, the night before OSHA's press conference to announce its decision, the Agency was rumored to be planning to adopt the 10 ppm time weighted average level, apparently unsure about the need for the much more stringent 1 ppm standard that was ultimately set.
There simply was no way to know or foresee how the Agency would make up its mind, except that it seemed clear it was probably going to have to make its decision on political grounds, not on need or feasibility. Thus, our only sensible course was to prepare a Petition for Review and stand ready to engage in a "race to the courthouse steps." We knew we would have to go "forum shopping" and pick a court because, under the Occupational Safety and Health Act appeal procedures, the party who files the first notice of appeal gets the United States Circuit Court of its choice. (Where suits challenging the same regulation are filed in more than one United States Circuit Court, all suits must be transferred to the circuit in which the appeal "was first instituted.") Our aim, of course, was to try to get our case before one of the Courts of Appeals that might be expected to interest itself in the complexities of such a matter.
Applying these concepts and objectives to the VCM rule making, the strategy we decided upon was to file our appeal--actually a Petition for Review of the final standard--in New York City in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Why this court? Simply because, in a previous decision, its Chief Judge had indicated at least some willingness to scrutinize OSHA decisions with enough care to reverse an unreasonable one, i.e., one which called for the use of more precautionary measures than seemed necessary or feasible.
We succeeded in securing the Second Circuit as a forum, but our luck ran out there. In what I believe may have been an unprecedented occurrence, every one.of the thirteen judges of the Second Circuit disqualified himself from hearing the case, presumably because all of them had some remote financial interest (stock or bond ownership, probably) in one of the multitude of companies in the proceeding. After every judge of the court declared himself unable to hear the case, in accordance with the federal and court rules, retired Supreme Court Justice Tom Clark was appointed to preside with two Distict CourtJudges completing the usual three-man panel.
In Basically, this is where we stand today exceptthat the PVC industry is again under investigation by some in OSHA. On December 18, 1979, the Agency published a notice requesting the latest information on the health effects of vinyl chloride and adding a new inquiry into alleged possible effects of polyvinyl chloride dust (Ref. 14) . A conference was held in connection with OSHA's request for information in March of this year. We consider it fair to say that no data not previously known to government and industry were presented at the sessions. We are, therefore, hopeful that the Agency's latest expressions of concern will be resolved without further regulatory action. This remains to be seen and no one in the industry is taking anything for granted. The effort to remove the "experimental" tag met its most unexpected first challenge when, in 1971, the Treasury Department decided that allowing full-scale marketing of PVC liquor bottles would be a "major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment," thus requiring preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, commonly referred to as "NEPA." Without belaboring the details, the final Environmental Impact Statement issued by BATF in 1973 was very favorable to PVC manufacturers. Based in large part on a study conducted by an independent consulting group (Bailie Associates), the Impact Statement concluded that PVC bottles are less energy intensive to produce than their glass counterparts. The EIS endorsed approval of PVC as a suitable container for use with distilled spirits (Ref. 16) .
With this hurdle out of the way, the road seemed clear for PVC liquor bottles. A stamp of approval here would also result in an increase in PVC's share of many processed food packaging markets where clear containers with good water vapor barrier properties were needed. Any authorization from BATF was always contingent upon satisfying FDA criteria for food safety, however, and suddenly another much more significant, and wholly unexpected problem arose.
About the same time BATF was finalizing its environmental asssessment of PVC liquor bottles, representatives of Schenley Distillers, Inc. were discovering that trace amounts of vinyl chloride were migrating from PVC bottles into distilled alcoholic beverages, such as vodka and gin. Most scientists were taken completely by surprise by this discovery because VCM is a gas at ten to fifteen degress below zero degrees centigrade. Hence, it was reasonably assumed that finding monomer in any foodstuff, much less a liquid, was not very likely.
Nonetheless, FDA and others subsequently confirmed the Schenley findings. It then advised BATF that it would be issuing a proposed regulation which, if finalized, would prohibit the packaging of alcoholic beverages in PVC bottles (Ref. 17 Despite all of these favorable signs for PVC, it seems to be most difficult to blow away the "little black cloud" hanging over it. This has to be more because of history than today's reality, and much more because of FDA's inaction than any adverse action it has taken.
Thus, for example, notwithstanding a recent unique Petition filed by The Society of the Plastics Industry, Inc. (SPI) urging "reapproval" by BATF of PVC liquor bottles, the Bureau is not expected to move until FDA provides it with a statement clearly indicating that PVC is now considered legally acceptable for this use. Anomalously, there really is no valid question of legality here since PVC remains "prior sanctioned" for.all uses under the Food Additives Amendment and FDA has so indicated in recent correspondence. This, however, is not enough to satisfy BATF--it feels it needs something more specific to avoid "being burned by FDA's vagaries again" (Note b).
There is a relevant collateral point worthy of mention here since it could have a bearing on when and how PVC's currently satisfactory legal status at FDA might ultimately be emphasized or at least become more clearly understood. In the wake of the United States Court of Appeals for the Note b: The fact that th[s is so [sdemonstrated by a BATF letter directed to the Bureau of Foods of the FDA by Mr. William T. Drake, Assistant Director of BATF on February 27, 1980. In this letter FDA has been requested to inform BATF about its position and undoubtedly will do so at some time in the future. Thus,. it should be recognized that the language in quotation marks in this sentence constitutes a paraphrasing of informal remarks made by BATF officials to inquirers; there is no official document where this language is used. Arguing that the standard merely reflected industry's best'available control technology, rather' than the degree of control necessary to protect public health, the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) brought suit in 1976 challenging the final' r'ule (Ref. 25) . After lengthynegotiations between EDF and EPA, "from which industry was' flatly excluded over" its vigorous'
District of Columbia
protests, EDF and EPA reached a "settlement agreement." In accordance with this compromise, EPA proposed amendments to cut the 10 ppm level by one-half, prohibit emission increases within thevi'cinity of existing plants due to expansion, and set an ultimate goal of"zeto" for vinyl chloride emissions. ' However, these emission reductions, proposed byEPA in June of 1977, haves for all practical purposes, beenabandoned by the'Agency.' EDF relatively recently sought to reopen the original proceedings on the grounds that EPA had reneged on its promise to' take final action on the proposed amendments by January 1, 1978. Strong oppositions were' filed by EPA'and SPI, both of which protested that the Agency should not decide on whether to amend the vinyl chloride standard until after reconsideration of EPAIs overall policy for dealing with carcinogens. Heeding these arguments, the court denied EDF's motion and refused to issue an order requiring compliance with the so-called settlement agreement.
vinyl chloride,, is still a "flagship" issue and appears"to be one'of the major stimuli behind the Agency's general review of its carcinogen regulations. This being the case, VCM may well be one of the first substances to which EPA's cancer policy, once finalized, will be applied. Meanwhile, industry is still having some difficulty coming into full compliance with the 1976standard, the major problems being emergency relief valveand reactor opening discharges.
In addition to the limitation on VCM emissions, the discharge of PVC waste into navigable waters is controlled through EPA's permit procedures estblished pursuant to the Clean Water Act (Ref. 26).
In the recently-issued Solid Waste Regulations--perhaps the most all-encompassing environmental regulations issued to date--EPA has been reasonably responsive to industry comments. For example, it adopted SPI's recommendation that PVC sludge beexcluded from the rule making (Ref. 27 ). This could be a temporary "plus,"however, because the Agency has mdicated that it intends to issue final regulations this fall which will classify and regulate, on a generic basis, the batch and solution residues from the production of all chlorinated polymers. * * *
The PVC story clearly illustrates the increasingly interdisciplinary nature of regulatory issues. The problemsthat. arose triggered a chain reaction among a variety of federal agencies including the three I have discussed in depth and the Consumer Product Safety Commission. These four agencies and the Department of Agriculture have since acknowledge that they share common regulatory concerns by joining together in the Inter-Agency Regulatory Liaison Group (IRLG), instituted to achieve a uniform approach to identifying protential carcinogens and estimating their risks.
Complicating all attempts to develop appropriate regulatory responses to carcinogenic hazards are the phenomenal, daily breakthroughs in scientific testing. Technological advancements are now enabling us to detect substances at levels where the impact may remain unknown forever.
There is no question in my mind but that regulatory agencies will have to integrate some sort of risk assessment methodology into ,their decisionmaking processes to prevent immobilization of industry. It has become too difficult to overcome the bureaucratic fear that a decision made today might look like a grievous error tomorrow because a more sensitive test method turns up a trace of a. substance shown to be a carcinogen, mutagen or teratogen at high levels. FDA has already taken steps in thisdirection by moving forward onits policy for dealing with lowlevels of putatively carcinogenic constitutents in. animal drug residues. The other agencies will have to play variations on this theme or bring an already seriously treatened chemical industry: economy to its knees.
Notwithstanding the general quagmire in which current Agency attempts to regulate deletei ions substances rest, the combined efforts of a responsible industry and concerned federal agencies appear to have eliminated the hazards associated with the manufacture .and use of PVC. Industry deserves much credit for having identified andcontrolled the vinyl chloride monpmer problem. Assuming the government also acts appropriately, using the common sense that sound risk assessment and related action diç-tate, it will some day have played its role in bringing this episode to an exemplary conclusion. If these principles are kept in the forefront as debate continues, they should pay off in the form of a stable market place for industry and a safer environment for everyone.
If the. VCM/PVC experience proves to have helped bring about this result, the "success story" label will be as worthwhile as it has been hard won. 
